What Geoffrey Mitchell KC Told the Inquiry About Scotland’s Economic Response to Covid-19

When the UK Covid-19 Inquiry opened its hearing yesterday, 24th November 2025, for Module 9 focusing on the pandemic’s Economic Response by the UK it was clear from the outset that each devolved nation would approach the evidence from its own constitutional, financial and operational experience. For Scotland, that task fell to Geoffrey Mitchell KC, representing the Scottish Ministers, who delivered a detailed and measured opening statement outlining the Scottish Government’s actions, constraints, challenges, and lessons arising from the economic shock of Covid-19.

For communities such as those represented by Excluded Scotland people whose livelihoods were destabilised, overlooked or directly harmed by economic decisions taken in London and Edinburgh alike Mitchell’s submissions provide essential clarity. They also help illustrate the wider structural issues that shaped the economic response and which, crucially, influenced who fell through the cracks.

Below is a comprehensive summary of his comments, structured for clarity and community relevance.

1. Setting the Scene: From Health Crisis to Economic Crisis

Mitchell began by establishing a simple but important premise: although Covid-19 started as a health crisis, it quickly became an economic one. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) from lockdowns to social distancing – were epidemiologically essential, but they carried unavoidable economic implications. Those implications demanded government support at speed and scale.

The Scottish Government therefore introduced a series of economic measures designed both to:

• mitigate the impact of restrictions, and
• support the public health aims underpinning those restrictions.

Key to his framing was the acknowledgement that economic decisions in Scotland also needed to consider the vulnerable, as well as communities already experiencing structural inequality.

2. The Complexity of Scotland’s Internal Economic Machinery

Before detailing the economic measures themselves, Mitchell highlighted an often-overlooked but significant structural reality: Scotland’s economic policymaking and fiscal management sit in two separate Directorates.

• Director-General Economy oversaw the economic response including business support and interventions.
• Director-General Scottish Exchequer oversaw fiscal strategy and funding constraints.

Although these teams worked closely, the split created additional coordination challenges, particularly when operating at speed while trying to align available funds with policy intent.

This structural feature matters because it forms part of the backdrop to capacity issues, timing delays and strategic uncertainties later highlighted in his statement.

3. The Central Challenge: A Fiscal Framework Not Designed for Emergencies

One of the most important themes in Mitchell’s opening was that Scotland’s existing fiscal framework governed jointly with the UK Government  was not designed for a civil emergency of this scale.

Key constraints included:

1. No power to borrow at scale to fund emergency rescue measures.
2. Dependence on UK fiscal decisions, including the timing of announcements and the level of Barnett Consequentials.
3. Inability to predict funding availability, complicating the design and deployment of targeted support.

For example, even when ministers in Edinburgh favoured earlier or more tailored interventions, the funding limitations meant Scotland was reactive to decisions made elsewhere.

The Barnett Guarantee – Welcome but Uncertain

Mitchell noted that after Scotland repeatedly sought flexibility, the UK Government introduced the Barnett Guarantee in July 2020 effectively promising a minimum level of funding resulting from UK decisions. But in practice the continued revisions and inconsistencies caused ongoing uncertainty, creating real-world opportunity costs.

Crucially, Scotland also chose to exceed the Consequentials for business support by around £0.5 billion, reflecting Scotland’s distinct economic structure, virus transmission patterns and differing restrictions.

This highlights one of the Inquiry’s underlying truths: devolved nations were expected to deliver bespoke support, yet within a tightly limited and inconsistent financial framework.

4. Data Challenges: A Pandemic Without the Right Information

Mitchell moved on to what he described as one of the key operational challenges: access to timely, detailed and relevant data.

What worked well

• Scotland’s Office of the Chief Economic Adviser (OCEA) rapidly expanded its analytical capability.
• OCEA collaborated with the ONS and other devolved administrations.
• The Chief Economist regularly briefed the First Minister and participated in UK-wide economic discussions.

But major gaps remained

• Identifying which businesses actually needed support was extremely difficult.
• HMRC held crucial operational data on individual businesses and employees but the Scottish Government could not access it.
• This lack of data particularly affected the design of grants for sectors without premises linked to non-domestic rates (e.g., freelancers, mobile traders, performers).

Mitchell emphasised that Scotland still faces technical, cultural and legislative barriers to accessing UK-held data, though a memorandum of understanding signed in July 2025 has begun addressing this.

For the Excluded community, this explanation matters: many gaps in support can be traced to structural data problems rather than policymakers’ intent alone.

5. Business Support: Bespoke Scottish Measures and Localised Delivery

Mitchell then turned to the Scottish Government’s business support measures. His statement highlights the sheer scale and variety of interventions created to fill the gaps left by UK-wide schemes.

Total business support exceeded £4.7 billion

This support was never intended to compensate businesses fully, but instead to help them survive the restrictions so they could restart after they were lifted.

Key elements included:

Non-Domestic Rates (NDR) Relief

• Based broadly on English relief schemes but with important Scottish variations.
• Aimed at sectors most directly affected by restrictions.

Small Business Grants and Retail/Hospitality/Leisure Grants

• Again based on English schemes but modified to reflect Scottish economic realities.
• Delivered via local authorities using NDR datasets – the only mechanism capable of scaling quickly in the early weeks.

This use of local government was repeatedly emphasised as a key strength. Mitchell described the working relationship with COSLA as “strong and effective”.

Sector-Specific and Gap-Filling Funds

Much of Scotland’s work, Mitchell stressed, went into filling gaps left by UK schemes echoing concerns long raised by Excluded Scotland.

These measures targeted:

• businesses without rateable premises
• sectors severely affected by restrictions
• local industries vital to particular communities (e.g., seafood processing)

6. Support for Jobs and the Self-Employed

This part of Mitchell’s statement is especially relevant to those who were excluded from UK-wide provisions.

Newly Self-Employed Hardship Fund

Designed specifically for:

• people who became self-employed within the year before the pandemic
• who therefore could not access the UK Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS)
• delivered in partnership with local authorities.

Furlough Support Grant

This supported businesses in five health board areas between 9 and 31 October 2020 by covering the 20% employer contribution required under furlough rules at that time.
It particularly benefitted the hospitality sector a sector heavily staffed by people with protected characteristics, including young workers, women, and minority ethnic groups.

These measures show targeted attempts to mitigate inequalities that were already apparent within the UK Government’s one-size-fits-all approaches.

7. Supporting Communities and Alleviating Hardship

Mitchell’s evidence makes clear that Scotland understood economic response not simply as business support, but as community survival.

Scottish Child Payment

He highlighted Scotland as the only UK nation to introduce a Scottish Child Payment, described as a “very significant anti-poverty measure”.

£350 million Third Sector and Vulnerable Support Package (March 2020)

This encompassed:

• additional support for the Scottish Welfare Fund
• crisis grants
• a resilience fund administered by Firstport, Social Investment Scotland and the Cora Foundation
• protection of organisations with a collective turnover of around £0.5 billion, safeguarding 14,000 jobs.

This portion of the statement underlines the Scottish Government’s view that economic protection must extend beyond businesses to the foundational organisations underpinning communities.

8. Fraud Prevention and Proportionate Controls

While other Core Participants focused on UK-wide fraud risks, Mitchell emphasised that Scotland’s fraud and error controls were proportionate and effective.

Key points:

• Many grants were administered by local authorities with existing fraud detection systems.
• The non-domestic rates dataset allowed “quick” and “appropriate” payment of grants.
• Audit Scotland reportedly considered Scotland’s fraud-mitigation approach a relative success compared to issues seen elsewhere.

This is notable because it directly contrasts with the scale of fraud later identified within the UK Government’s Bounce Back Loan Scheme.

9. Structural Lessons and Future Preparedness

Mitchell concluded with reflections designed to guide future emergency economic response and for the Excluded Scotland community these are of HUGE IMPORTANCE!

He identified several key forward-looking priorities:

1. Reform of the UK Fiscal Framework

Scotland needs:

• emergency borrowing capacity
• predictable upfront funding
• agreements on adapting fiscal rules during crises
• clarity on how UK-wide measures will account for all devolved nations.

2. Better Data Sharing

Future crises will require:

• rapid sharing of HMRC and DWP data
• elimination of cultural and legislative data-sharing barriers
• implementation of the new July 2025 data-sharing memorandum.

3. Consideration of Scotland’s Distinct Economic Structure

Any future UK-wide response must allow for:

• differing business demography
• differing patterns of restriction
• localised economic vulnerabilities (e.g., island communities, tourism dependency).

4. Enhanced Preparedness for Rapid Decision-Making

Better pre-agreed frameworks would improve:

• speed
• clarity
• consistency
• ministerial discretion

particularly in fast-moving crisis environments.

10. His Closing Reflection: Recognising Human Suffering

Mitchell ended by acknowledging that, while his statement focused solely on economic matters, the Scottish Government “does not forget the many forms of suffering” experienced across Scotland’s communities during the pandemic.

This closing remark, while brief, situates the economic discussion within a broader human context – one that resonates strongly with those who experienced income loss, exclusion or financial devastation not captured within headline support schemes.

Conclusion: What Mitchell’s Opening Statement Tells Us About Scotland’s Pandemic Economics

Geoffrey Mitchell KC’s submission to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry offers an important insight into Scotland’s position within the UK’s wider economic response.

Three themes stand out:

1. Structural constraints shaped outcomes.

The Scottish Government’s ability to act was significantly limited by UK fiscal rules, unpredictable Consequentials, and the absence of borrowing powers. Those limitations directly contributed to timing delays, uncertainty, and gaps in support.

2. Scotland attempted to fill gaps left by UK-wide schemes.

Several of the most significant Scottish interventions – including the Newly Self-Employed Hardship Fund and sector-specific funds were created specifically because the UK-designed schemes excluded large sections of Scotland’s workforce.

This is a key acknowledgement for Excluded Scotland campaigners.

3. Data access was a serious problem.

Without access to HMRC and DWP data, Scotland struggled to design targeted schemes, contributing to the patchiness of support. This barrier, long known to campaign groups, is now formally recognised within the Inquiry’s evidence.

For those campaigning on behalf of people who were excluded from support during the pandemic, Mitchell’s opening statement offers rare official recognition that the system itself structurally, fiscally, constitutionally and operationally – was not built to cope with a crisis of this magnitude. Many of the inequities that people experienced were baked into the UK’s existing arrangements.

As Module 9 progresses, Scotland’s distinct experience will continue to be a critical element of understanding how future economic crises must be handled differently – and how to ensure no community is left behind again.

Footnote:
It should be noted that not all Scottish Government COVID-19 grants were administered by local authorities. Two key schemes;- namely the Newly Self-Employed and Mobile Close Contact grants were instead processed by the third-party company UMi in England. These schemes, widely discussed within the Excluded Scotland community as the “#grantshambles”, suffered significant delays: announced in December 2020, opened for applications 16th February 2021, yet many applicants were still awaiting payment well into April despite submitting on time. This context is essential for understanding the full picture of grant delivery during the period.